Notice: Function _load_textdomain_just_in_time was called incorrectly. Translation loading for the limit-login-attempts-reloaded domain was triggered too early. This is usually an indicator for some code in the plugin or theme running too early. Translations should be loaded at the init action or later. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 6.7.0.) in /home1/enabling/public_html/blog/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6121

Deprecated: Hook site-logo is deprecated since version 13.4! Use custom-logo instead. Jetpack no longer supports site-logo feature. Add custom-logo support to your theme instead: https://developer.wordpress.org/themes/functionality/custom-logo/ in /home1/enabling/public_html/blog/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6121

Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /home1/enabling/public_html/blog/wp-includes/functions.php:6121) in /home1/enabling/public_html/blog/wp-includes/feed-rss2-comments.php on line 8
Comments on: The interventionist’s first tool https://www.enablingchange.com.au/blog/strategy-2/the-interventionists-first-tool/ Treats for changemakers, from Les Robinson. Wed, 23 Sep 2015 20:51:08 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.2 By: Les Robinson https://www.enablingchange.com.au/blog/strategy-2/the-interventionists-first-tool/#comment-125 Wed, 23 Sep 2015 20:51:08 +0000 https://changeologyblog.wordpress.com/?p=927#comment-125 Hi Liam… Thanks for your comments. I’d be very interested in what you learn from using this tool: I’d love to find ways to tweek it. God luck with your mission!

]]>
By: Liam Gardener https://www.enablingchange.com.au/blog/strategy-2/the-interventionists-first-tool/#comment-124 Wed, 23 Sep 2015 15:35:01 +0000 https://changeologyblog.wordpress.com/?p=927#comment-124 Les, interesting framework here. I found it as I prepare to travel next week to a post-conflict, West African country to do a couple of presentations on regulatory and institutional reform in a sector that has been plagued with corruption, mismanagement and poor governance for decades and which has suffered in the last decade from the well-intentioned efforts of ODA “innocents abroad” magic bullet solutions and tremendous political/economic pressure from multi-nationals and their local beneficiaries to continue with the status quo. In that context, the response domain is the “Chaotic” one. The biggest problem lies in getting acceptance that this is where things are. For the international development community (which provides the bulk of the financing available for reform), they are strongly vested in seeing situations as “familiar” or “unfamiliar”, with allowance for a bit of “reactive”. This is due to the nature and political economy of their financing and ODA in general. I am considering if I may find a way to introduce your framework into the working group discussions to try and get the local stakeholders to analyze where they are and push back on the ODA actors.

]]>
By: Les Robinson https://www.enablingchange.com.au/blog/strategy-2/the-interventionists-first-tool/#comment-123 Tue, 22 Sep 2015 22:32:15 +0000 https://changeologyblog.wordpress.com/?p=927#comment-123 In reply to Mel Hillery.

Hi Mel,
I think the answer is: all three examples were incurious about the complexity and reactivity of the social environments they were entering into, and chose styles of intervention (cumbersome, massive, one-off roll-outs) that lacked agility or the possibility of local variation, not only failing to consult locals, but failing even to make use of the multi-disciplinary expertise that was available if they’d invited it into the design process.
The 2003 Iraq Invasion was a business-as-usual project of the Pentagon utterly unprepared for the reactions of Iraqi society, starkly demonstrated by the sacking of the Baghdad archaeological museum by criminal gangs and individuals almost immediately after the capture of the city. The 2007 NT Intervention was sketched on the back of an envelope by (ex military officer) Mal Brough and John Howard and involved essentially a military invasion of NT communities and the stripping of local autonomy: no account was taken of how indigenous people would react to those measures. It is still completely unclear – despite disputed claims both ways – whether the sum result is negative or positive, largely I believe because indigenous people are now so thoroughly alienated they refuse to cooperate with evaluators. The Pink Batts Program was prepared by young, well-meaning, inexperienced staff in the Department of the Environment (I saw them at work). They were ambushed by the surprising number of cowboy operators out there, something they would have become aware off if they had used more seasoned industry expertise.
The aim of this model is to counsel program designers large and small to be cautious and curious about the complexity and reactivity in the social environments they are entering into and respond by, either:
– “bespoke programs” which mobilise outside expertise to craft carefully tailored multi-pronged strategies and proceed by pilots; or
– “experimental programs” which learn their way be proceeding by modest experiments with local outsourcing; or
– “emergency programs” which enable and empower local agents and actors to respond as they see fit.
Thanks for asking Mel; it’s helped me be clearer about the ideas, and I’ve edited the post as a result.
Cheers – LKes

]]>
By: Mel Hillery https://www.enablingchange.com.au/blog/strategy-2/the-interventionists-first-tool/#comment-122 Tue, 22 Sep 2015 12:08:13 +0000 https://changeologyblog.wordpress.com/?p=927#comment-122 Interesting post thanks Les but some more well know and worked through examples would really help this I think. In particular I was intrigued by where you think your three examples…Iraq invasion, pink batts and NT intervention sit in your diagram (as in where the mismatch was)…or perhaps there are some easier examples.

]]>